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I, Copyright
By Garrett Huson*

Today’s technology has taken Artificial Intelligence (AI)
from being an invention of science fiction to a cornerstone of
our modern lives. With the creation of machines that have the
potential to do almost anything that a human can do, people
will be left with only one way to distinguish themselves from
these intelligent machines: the arts. But what happens when an
AI creates art? This article will address the potential
authorship rights and copyright protections that could be
afforded to an AI, should it create an original work.
Furthermore, this article will explore the concept of “human
rights,” the origins of copyright rights, and the rights of
authorship. Moreover, it will consider three possible answers to
the above question: (1) the creator of the program has the
copyright; (2) the AI can have protections under copyright law;
or (3) no one gains protections to the works created by the AI,
and conclude by determining that any original work created by
an AI should automatically pass into the public domain.
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INTRODUCTION
Can computers even be considered “human”? Will the current
search for the best technological advances eventually have people
competing with machines? Artificial Intelligence (“AI”), colloquially,
is a term used for when a machine imitates the “cognitive” functions
commonly associated with human minds, such as “problem solving”
and “learning.”1
Most of humanity has a certain image of AI, one that has been
depicted time and time again throughout the films of the late 60’s and
up to current times.2 The general fear of AI portrayed by media has
distracted society from the fact that AI has become an ever growing
and essential part of our everyday lives. However, AI becoming close
to a human level of consciousness is a theoretical quandary currently
being “duked out” by the likes of Elon Musk and Mark Zuckerberg.3
This includes systems that help scan digital images, heart sound
analysis in the field of medicine,4 and cars with AI-based driving
assistance functions.5

1

See Stuart J. Russell & Peter Norvig, Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach 4-5 (1995).
See 2001: A Space Odyssey (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1968); Star Trek: The Motion Picture
(Paramount Pictures 1979); Tron (Walt Disney Productions 1982); Wargames (MGM/UA
Entertainment Company 1983); The Terminator (Orion Pictures 1984); The Matrix Trilogy
(Warner Bros 1999-2003); I, Robot (20th Century Fox 2004); Wall-E (Walt Disney Pictures
2008); Captain America: The Winter Soldier (Walt Disney Productions 2014); Transcendence
(Warner Bros. Pictures 2014); and who can forget the Transformers Franchises from the 80’s to
the latest film, scheduled to release in 2017.
3
See Stephane Kasriel, Why Elon Musk is Wrong about AI, FORTUNE (July 27, 2017)
http://fortune.com/2017/07/27/elon-musk-mark-zuckerberg-ai-debate-work/; Ian Bogost, Why
Zuckerberg and Musk are Fighting About the Robot Future, THE ATLANTIC (July 27,2017)
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/07/musk-vs-zuck/535077/; Sam Shead,
Elon Musk Fires Back at Mark Zuckerberg in Debate About the Future: ‘His Understanding of
the
Subject
Is
Limited’,
BUSINESS
INSIDER
(July
25,
2017)
http://www.businessinsider.com/mark-zuckerberg-said-elon-musks-doomsday-ai-predictionsare-irresponsible-2017-7.
4
See T.R. Reed, Nancy E. Reed & Peter Fritzon, Heart Sound Analysis For Symptom Detection
And Computer-Aided Diagnosis, 12 SIMULATION MODELLING PRACTICE AND THEORY 129
(2004).
5
Such as self-parking and advanced cruise control.
2
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AIs have become increasingly functional and used more and
more in today’s world to help with our modern conveniences. Large
corporations have been investing billions of dollars into these
functionalities to make our lives simpler and less hazardous.6 Some
AI have even been programmed to make decisions on complex
procedural legal issues involving statutory analysis.7
However, with all the current applications of AI, these systems
have yet to achieve a functionality considered “sentient.” An entire
field of science within the realm of artificial intelligence, known as
cognitive robotics, has developed a theory of “machine
consciousness.” The aim of the theory is to define “that which would
have to be synthesized were consciousness to be found in an
engineered [artifact].”8 In other words, the aim of the theory is to
figure out a definition for consciousness that can be replicated into a
computer. Should these “engineered artifacts” eventually gain humanlevel consciousness through an evolution of their programming, 9
humanity will be faced with a series of philosophical questions.
Along with the questions of imparting basic rights onto
machines, people must figure out how they will contend and live with
machines that do many jobs formerly performed only by humans. AI
might someday replace doctors, lawyers, hedge fund managers,
mechanics, and even farmers. As the potential for machines to
provide everything, from food to services for humanity, people will
be left with the only other way we have distinguished ourselves from
the rest of the Earth’s animals--the arts. But what happens when an
engineered artifact creates something artistic?
This article seeks to answer the following questions: Can an
artificial intelligence be credited as an author of a work under current
copyright law? Whether copyright law needs to be revised to
accommodate the possibility of an AI as an author? Who should be
given the protections under copyright law when, or if, an artificial
intelligence creates something? And, whether the assignment of rights
to either the creator of the AI or the AI itself is beneficial to
humanity?
6

See John Biggs, Ford invests $1 billion in Pittsburgh-based Argo AI to Build Self-driving Cars
by 2021, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 18, 2017) https://techcrunch.com/2017/02/18/ford-invests-inpittsburgh-based-argo-ai-to-build-self-driving-cars-by-2021/.
7
See Eric Allen Engle, An Introduction to Artificial Intelligence and Legal Reasoning: Using
xTalk to Model the Alien Tort Claims Act and Torture Victim Protection Act, 11 Rich. J.L. &
Tech. 2, 4 (2004).
8
Igor Aleksander, Artificial Neuroconsciousness: An Update, IWANN (1995).
9
Machine learning and self-programming have become staples in attempts to create a sentient
machine.
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To answer these questions, Sections I and II will first explore the
concept of “human rights” and their previous and current applications
to both different classes of people who were previously not
considered human and to non-human entities. Sections III-VI will
then explore the origins of copyright rights and the rights of
authorship, analyzing the philosophy leading to the creation of
authorial rights and their current applications. The article will then
conclude with three possible answers to the questions above: (1) the
creator or owner of the program has the copyright (Section VII); (2)
the AI can have protections under copyright law (Section VIII); or (3)
no one gains protections to the works created by the AI (Section IX).
I.

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND HUMAN INTELLIGENCE

AI can be divided into either general or expert systems of
intelligence.10 Computer programs that attempt to simulate
intelligence generally are defined as general systems. These general
systems have no fixed limited class of problems.11 In other words,
they are not bound within the programming confines of another nonAI. On the other hand, expert systems are programs geared to solving
a limited class of problems while inferring implications from a given
knowledge base – either static and preprogrammed or dynamic and
adaptable.12 Most current applications of artificial intelligence are
formulated on rule-based, expert systems.13 Examples of this can be
found in auto-pilots, “artistic” programs for screen-savers, fraud
protection programs, social media algorithms, and many other every
day uses within our society.14 Input of specific stimuli into the
program will cause the AI to provide results limited to the
programmed answers it was given.15 Providing a program with every
recording of classical music and asking it to create a song will cause a
rule-based, expert system to create something of a medley of the
works over something original using the works as “inspiration.”
The brain of a human, however, works differently than the brain
of a computer. The human mind works computing analog data that is
continuous – a range of values – and computers operate using digital
10

Engle, supra note 7, at 5.
See, e.g., Ben Coppin, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE ILLUMINATED 259-60 (Jones & Bartlett
2004) (comparing frame-based representational systems with expert systems).
12
Engle, supra note 7, at 5.
13
See, e.g., Jonathan Baxter, et al., Learning to Play Chess Using Temporal Differences, 40
MACHINE LEARNING 243, 243-63 (2000),
http://cs.anu.edu.au/people/Lex.Weaver/pub_sem/publications/MACH1451-98.pdf.
14
Gautam Narula, Everyday Examples of Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning,
TechEmergence (Sept. 16, 2018), https://www.techemergence.com/everyday-examples-of-ai/.
15
Baxter, supra note 13.
11
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data that is binary – either off or on.16 Virtually all of today’s
computers operate digitally due to their microprocessors, which make
the digital representations acceptable and indistinguishable from an
analog representation while being easier to store and transmit.17
Examples of an analog computer include the slide rule.18 Think of
this as a string of lights in which each light turns on or off but never
at the same time as the others within the string. Due to the output of
the microprocessors, the light moves up and down the string of lights
so quickly it looks as if there is only a single light fluidly moving
back and forth. This gives an illusion of a bead moving along a slide
rule. This is how a machine would eventually simulate a human mind.
Additionally, the human mind operates as a massive parallel
processor along with the use of analog principles.
The brain seems to be a computer with a radically different
style. For example, the brain changes as it learns, it appears
to store and process information in the same places . . . Most
obviously, the brain is a parallel machine, in which many
interactions occur at the same time in many different
channels.19
During parallel processing, one hemisphere works on solving a
problem while the other hemisphere does the same.20 Both sides
compare notes and decide which is the best way to solve a problem.21
Additionally, when the human brain is unable to find an answer to a
current problem it will either seek an earlier answer or skip to a new
problem in the hopes that solving another problem will grant insight
to the previously skipped ones.22 During this time, the brain is
“comparing search strategies by a dialogue between the left
(execution) and right (creative) hemispheres.”23
Of course, it is possible to do parallel processing with
software using networked computers. Although this was not
the origin of computing, it may be the future or [sic] thinking
16

See Engle, supra note 7, at n. 18.
See generally FACT MONSTER, Computer,
https://www.factmonster.com/encyclopedia/science-and-technology/computers-and-electricalengineering/computers-and-computing/computer (2012) (discussing the modern pervasiveness
of digital computers as compared with analog computers).
18
Andrew Grygus, History, AUTOMATION ACCESS, http://www.aaxnet.com/info/hist.html (last
visited Oct. 12, 2018).
19
Engle, supra note 7, at n. 22.
20
See generally Jonathan Strickland, How Parallel Processing Works, HOWSTUFFWORKS (Apr.
28, 2008), https://perma.cc/5ZTJ-F472 (describing the 605 parallel processor).
21
Id.
22
Engle, supra note 7, at 5.
23
Id.
17
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like a traditional serial microprocessor, is essentially a linear
function. The serial processor steps through each command
sequentially. Commands are run only sequentially, and
results are not compared to the results of outside processors.
Computers may evolve toward parallel processing, as we can
already see in distributed computing applications such as
SETI [Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence]. However
very little work has been done on programming computers to
emulate human creativity, other than generating random art.
Perhaps this is due to the fact computer scientists tend to
think sequentially, whereas artists tend to think
holistically.24
Several means have been created to test machine intelligence.
The most well-known method is the Turing Test. This test, developed
in 1950 by Alan Turing, is to examine a machine’s ability to exhibit
intelligent behavior that is equivalent or indistinguishable from a
human. The test had a human evaluator – player C – tasked to
determine which of the two other players – A or B – is the computer
and the human. Questions were limited to a written format with
responses also being written.25 This is shown in the diagram below: 26

FIGURE 1

24

Id. at 7. See also, Id. at 9.
See Alan Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence, 59 MIND 433, 433--434 (1950).
26
See A. P. Saygin, I. Cicekli, & Varol Akman, Turing Test: 50 Years Later, 10 MINDS AND
MACHINES 464, 465 (2000) (image adapted).
25
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Though there are weaknesses to the Turing Test,27 since
imitating human behavior is not the same as exhibiting intelligent
behavior,28 “[r]obots that act indistinguishably from humans can also
be expected to respond indistinguishably from [humans] in response
to legal pressures”.29 This expectation of responses to legal pressures
make AI that pass the Turing Test, virtually as accountable for its
actions as a human. This article will now explore the evolution of
“human” rights and their inconsistent application, in addition to the
utilitarian theory which helped create intellectual property rights
within the United States.
II.

EVOLUTION AND APPLICATION OF “HUMAN” RIGHTS IN
THE UNITED STATES

In the United States, the idea of unalienable human rights has
been ingrained in our society since the founding of this country,
placing the concept into the Declaration of Independence, stating:
“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their [c]reator with certain
unalienable [r]ights, that among these are [l]ife, [l]iberty and the
pursuit of [h]appiness.”30
These “natural rights” were influenced heavily by the English
philosopher John Locke, who stated that there are three natural rights
in which all people are entitled: Life, liberty, and estate.31 The writer
of the Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jefferson, stated that
John Locke was one of “the three greatest men that have ever
lived.”32
John Locke’s development of his theory of natural rights was
influenced, ironically, by his readings of reports pertaining to the
Native Americans, whom Locke regarded as natural peoples who
lived in a state of liberty and “perfect freedom,” but not license.33

It has been suggested that Alan Turing’s recommendation of imitating not human adult
consciousness, but the consciousness of a human child is enough to be taken seriously. See Sam
S. Adams et al., Mapping the Landscape of Human-Level Artificial General Intelligence 2, 1112 http://web.eecs.utk.edu/~itamar/Papers/AI_MAG_2011.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2017).
28
See Ayse Pinar Saygin & Ilyas Cicekli, Pragmatics in human-computer conversations, 34 J.
OF PRAGMATICS 227-258 (2002)
29
James Grimmelmann, Copyright for Literate Robots, 101 IOWA L. REV. 657, 680 (2016).
30
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE pmbl. (U.S. 1776).
31
See John Locke, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 305 (Awnsham Churchill 1690).
32
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Trumbull (Feb. 15, 1789) (on file with The American
Treasures of the Library of Congress).
33
John Locke, SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT 8 (C. B. Macpherson ed., Hackett Classics
1980) (1960).
27
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Unfortunately, in the implementation of these rights by the
newly formed government of the United States, not “all men” were
considered to have these natural rights, nor did any women. Not only
were these “natural rights” not imparted onto any non-white males,
but it took several amendments to the country’s foundational legal
document to clarify that women and minorities were, in fact, human
and therefore given, by the country’s law, these naturally occurring
rights.34
Expanding upon the philosophy of inalienable natural rights,
“human” rights have equally been inconsistently applied. Human
rights are understood as “inalienable fundamental rights to which a
person is inherently entitled simply because she or he is a human
being.”35 In 1948 the United Nations General Assembly adopted the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”).36 This
declaration declared a series of rights to all humans around the
world37, although specific members of the United nations abstained
from the vote as specific articles ran contrary to regional power
dynamics.38
Within the United States, interpretations of the rights laid out
within the UDHR, allow for some rights – such as right to healthcare
– to rank as a lower category compared to other rights because of
potential effects on capitalist markets.39 The right to death, which is
derived from the right to life recognized under the UDHR, is
generally considered to be illegal within most of the United States as
euthanasia or assisted suicide.40 However, the act of taking, or
attempting to take, one’s own life is not against the law in most
States.41
While technology continues to advance, rights associated with
the convenience and freedoms that these technologies provide have
begun to be considered and argued as “basic human rights.” For

34

See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
Magdalena Supuldeva et al., HUMAN RIGHTS REFERENCE HANDBOOK 3 (3rd ed. 2004).
36
G.A. Res. 217A (III), Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948).
37
Id.
38
Mary Ann Glendon, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL
DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 19-20 (2002).
39
Karen S. Palmer MPH, MS Address to the Physicians for a National Health Program (PNHP)
Meeting in San Francisco (Spring 1999) (transcript available at http://www.pnhp.org/facts/abrief-history-universal-health-care-efforts-in-the-us).
40
See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); See also Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U,S, 494 (1977).
41
Robert E Litman, Medical-Legal Aspects of Suicide, 6 WASHBURN L. J. 395, 395 (1997).
35
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example, the right to internet access has been associated with rights to
freedom of speech and the right to freedom of assembly.42
Additionally, statutes such as the Humane Slaughter Act 43 and
other regulations pertaining to the treatment of animals are the efforts
of the proponents believing that many, if not all, non-human animals
are entitled to the possession of their own lives and the most basic
interests of these rights – including the avoidance of suffering –
should be afforded the same considerations as the interests of human
beings.44
In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores the Supreme Court of the
United States determined that the U.S. Department of Health of
Human Services (“HHS”) could not require a for-profit corporation to
provide health insurance coverage for birth control, as it would be a
violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”).45 The
Court found that the regulations would run contrary to the corporate
owner’s religious beliefs and therefore could not be mandated onto
the corporation.46 The Court, in its decision stated “[t]he term
‘person’ sometimes encompasses artificial persons . . . and it
sometimes is limited to natural persons. But no conceivable definition
of the term includes natural persons and nonprofit corporations, but
not for-profit corporations.”47
The notion that corporations have the same rights as natural
person is nothing new to the United States. As early as 1818, the U.S.
Supreme Court continuously recognized corporations as having the
same rights as natural persons and have been granting corporate
entities an expanding list of rights.48
In the realm of creativity and U.S. copyright law, corporations
have been granted the title of author and owner of copyrights under
the “works-made-for-hire” doctrine.49 This allows the corporation to
42

James Vincent, UN Condemns internet access disruption as a human rights violation, THE
VERGE, (July 4, 2016, 4:33 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2016/7/4/12092740/un-resolutioncondemns-disrupting-internet-access.
43
See 7 U.S.C.A. § 1902 (2012) (note the irony in that no slaughter can possibly be “humane”).
44
See Angus Taylor, ANIMALS AND ETHICS: AN OVERVIEW OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL DEBATE
(2009); Mark Rowlands, ANIMAL RIGHTS: A DEFENSE (2009).
45
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 143 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
46
Id. at 2785.
47
Id. at 2769.
48
See Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 525-27 (1819) (recognizing
the right to contract and enforce contracted agreements); Society for the Propagation of the
Gospel in Foreign Parts v. Town of Pawlet, 29 U.S. 480, 501-502 (1830) (expanding property
rights of natural persons to corporations); Northwestern Nat Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243,
255 (1906) (accepting corporations as “persons” for legal purposes).
49
Community For Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
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gain copyright protection of works created by the corporate
employees.50
While natural rights arguments have been made regarding the
application of copyright and patent law51, the rights to the protection
of one’s intellectual property and right to protect one’s expression do
not originate, within the United States, from these theories.52 In the
next section, this article will discuss additional theories leading to the
creation of “human” rights, specifically the origins of copyright law
within the United States.
III.

CONSEQUENTIALISM, UTILITARIANISM, AND CREATION
OF US COPYRIGHT

Other arguments regarding the origins of human rights,
such as those by John Finnis, state that human rights are
justifiable because the rights have an instrumental value in
creating a necessary condition for the well-being of humanity.53
The interest theory states that a respect for human rights by
other individuals is a move in self-interest. “Human rights law,
applied to a State’s own citizens serves the interest of State, by,
for example, minimizing the risk of violent resistance and
protest by keeping the level of dissatisfaction with the
government manageable.”54
This idea of governmental recognition of rights as acting in
self-interest is further explained through consequentialist
theories. Consequentialism is the doctrine that the morality of
an action is judged solely by its consequences, that “the value
and especially the moral value of an act should be judged by the
value of its consequences.”55
The most popular position of consequentialism is
utilitarianism, which defines the “best” value as those acts in
which people are, in total, as happy as possible.56 In the opening
statement of the principle of utility, Jeremy Bentham wrote:
Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two
sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to
50

Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012).
Linking the rights of intellectual property with natural right to property stated by Locke. See
Grimmelmann, supra note 29.
52
See Sara K. Stadler, Forging a Truly Utilitarian Copyright, 91 IOWA L. REV. 609 (2006).
53
See Jon Finnis, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 30 (1980).
54
Niraj Nathwani, RETHINKING REFUGEE LAW 25 (2003).
55
Consequentialism, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
consequentialism (last visited Oct. 5, 2018).
56
See generally Frederick Rosen, CLASSICAL UTILITARIANISM FROM HUME TO MILL (2015).
51
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point out what we ought to do . . . By the principle of utility
is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of
every action whatsoever according to the tendency it appears
to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party
whose interest is in question: or, what is the same thing in
other words to promote or to oppose that happiness. I say of
every action whatsoever, and therefore not only of every
action of a private individual, but of every measure of
government.57

The basic premise of utilitarian thought has become a
staple in the creation of laws throughout the United States.58
Incentives are created to maximize pleasure. Whereas,
disincentives are created to minimize pain.
The copyright clause of the U.S. Constitution is generally
accepted as an outcome of utilitarian thought. Article 1 of the
Constitution empowers Congress “to promote the [p]rogress of
[s]cience and useful [a]rts, by securing for limited [t]imes to
[a]uthors and [i]nventors the exclusive [r]ight to their respective
[w]ritings and [d]iscoveries.”59
The utilitarian value in granting these exclusive rights –
monopolies – to an author for a work she or he created is
weighed against the value of placing that work within the public
domain. “It would appear to be safe to assume that there is some
incentive value to the grant of monopoly which results in the
creation of new and useful works, so there is some utility in the
grant of copyright.”60
The exclusive rights given to the holder of a copyright, and
thus creating the copyright holder’s monopoly, are: (1) the right
to reproduce the copyrighted work; (2) the right to create
derivative works based on the copyrighted work; (3) the right to
distribute the copyrighted work; (4) the right of public
performance of the work; (5) the right to display the work; and
(6) the right to transmit the work as a form of public
performance, specific to sound recordings.61
57

Jeremy Bentham, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 14
(Batoche Books 2000) (1789).
58
Many criminal justice textbooks discuss utilitarianism as a mechanism for the creation of
criminal codes and statutes. See generally Joshua Dressler & Stephen Garvey, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW (7th ed. 2015).
59
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
60
Rob Kittredge, Economic Measures, Origin of Copyright, pt. 5 at 1, https://rkip.ca/wpcontent/uploads/2015/04/Origins-of-Copyright-Part-5-Economic-Measureswww.RKIP_.ca_.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2018).
61
17 U.S.C. § 106.
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The rights are designed to reward those who have created a
copyrightable work. The incentive of obtaining exclusive rights
and the disincentive to copy someone else’s work, through the
copyright holder’s ability to prosecute copiers, is meant to
incentivize others to create their own works, seek their own
protections, and be more creative as a society.62 These
monopolies, however, are not granted indefinitely. 63 While the
term “limited times” has changed over the years, the idea that
incentivizing people to create by granting them protections over
their creations remains the same.64
While there is criticism to the exact utilitarian value found
in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act65 (“CTEA”),
which extended copyright protections of works to 70 years after
the death of the author66, and the Supreme Court holding in
Eldred v. Ashcroft, which rejected a challenge to the CTEA as
not being a perpetual copyright, this article does not seek to
analyze these concerns.67 In the following sections, this article
will discuss the requirements for obtaining a copyright – being
legally recognized as an author and authorship in general – and
potential resolutions should an artificial intelligence produce
something which meets those requirements.
IV.

OBTAINING A COPYRIGHT AUTHORSHIP

To obtain a copyright, a work must be an “original work[] of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now or later
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine
or device.”68 Essentially, copyright protections are granted to works
meeting the two requirements of “original” and “fixed.”69
The term “original” as used in copyright, means only that the
work was created independently, as opposed to copied, by an author
and possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity.70 This
62

See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003)
Id.
64
Id.
65
Or pejoratively known as the “Micky Mouse Protection Act”
66
17 U.S.C. § 302(a).
67
Elder, 537 U.S. at 194.
68
17 U.S.C. § 102.
63

69

Id.

Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). See also Bleistein v.
Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903) (stating that a creator has does enough to
merit copyrightable authorship merely by placing his pen upon the paper). See Peter Jaszi,
Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphosis of “Authorship,” 1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 483
70

66
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requirement of minimally creative originality differs from the notion
of novelty or invention from patent law.71 Furthermore, to be original
a work must be created by the will of the author, using her or his own
skill, labor, and judgement, contributing something recognizable as
the author’s own compared to other works within a similar subject.72
Copyright law centers mainly around the concept of authorship,
yet the subject is only beginning to gain attention within the courts
and among scholars.73 Scholars who have written on the subject
believe that it is necessary to view the relationship between authors
and works to properly understand and establish authorship.74
Many scholars believe that the three basic requirements set by
the courts, originality, creativity – separated from originality – and
fixation are insufficient “for determining whether a work is the
writing of an author.”75 Thus an additional requirement is needed:
The intent of the author to create a mental effect in an audience.76
During the mid to late 19th century, Congress, using the
Copyright Clause of Article 1, attempted to enact federal trademark
legislation.77 However, upon challenge, the Supreme Court held that
this law was unconstitutional.78
Justice Miller explained in the Trade-Mark Cases:
[W]hile the word writings may be liberally construed, as it
has been, to include original designs or engravings, prints,
etc., it is only such as are original, and are founded in the
creative powers of the mind. The writings which are to be
protected are the fruits of intellectual labor, embodied in the
(stating that “The Bleistein opinion, with its emphasis on the ‘work’ and its abdication of a
judicial role as aesthetic arbiter, both effaces and generalizes ‘authorship,’ leaving this category
with little or no meaningful content and none of its traditional associations”).
71
Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer 65 F.2d 1, 25 (9th Cir. 1933), cert denied 54 S. Ct. 94 (1934).
72
See Doran v. Sunset House Distributing Corp, 304 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1962).
73
Jane C. Ginsburg, The Concept of Authorship in Comparative Copyright Law, 52 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1063, 1066 (2003) (“Few judicial decisions address what authorship means, or who is an
author.”); David Nimmer, Copyright in the Dead Sea Scrolls, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 13 (2001)
(“U.S. Copyright law adopts a concept of authorship that is remarkably broad, albeit not
completely unbounded. Its roots lie not in theory, but in an uncritical inquiry into whether the
work in question owes its origin to the putative author.”). Peter Jaszi, one of the few scholars to
discuss copyright theory, notes: “Legal scholars concerned with copyright occupy themselves
not by analyzing copyright theory, but instead by debating the rights and wrongs of technical
doctrinal issues presented by judicial opinions.” Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of CopyrightL
The Metamorphosis of “Authorship,” 1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 458.
74
See Christopher Buccafusco, A Theory of Copyright Authorship, 102 VA. L. REV. 1229
(2016).
75
Id.at 1232.
76
Id.
77
Act of Aug. 14, 1876, ch. 274, 19 Stat. 141.
78
In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 82-83, 99 (1879).
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form of books, engravings, and the like.79
Justice Miller noted that a trademark does not have to meet these
standards: “It requires no fancy or imagination, no genius, no
laborious thought.”80
This opinion helped the law move towards a theory of authors
and their writings by establishing two requirements for copyrightable
authorship: originality and intellectual labor. However, the opinion
offered very little guidance on the definition of intellectual labor,
while keeping the threshold of originality very low.81
In the mid 1880’s the Court was again asked to construe the
terms “authors” and “writings.” In Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co v.
Sarony, the Court declared an author to be “he to whom anything
owes its origin; originator; maker; one who completes a work of
science or literature.”82 Additionally, the Court provided a broad
definition of “writings”: “all forms of writing, printing, engraving,
etching, [et]c., by which the ideas in the mind of the author are given
visible expression.”83
The philosopher Jerrold Levinson described two categories of
intentions that people may have in creating their works: semantic
intentions and categorical intentions.84 Semantic intentions are those
having to do with the meaning or interpretation of the work.85 For
example, a person might intend for her or his works to be considered
scary, and she or he may succeed or fail on having the intended
audience appreciate that intent based on several factors.86 While this
form of intent has been at the center of literary theory for the past
half-century, it is not important for determining whether a person is
an author.87

79

Id. at 94.
Id.; See also Nat’l Tel. News Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 119 F. 294, 297-98 (7th Cir. 1902)
(“Authorship implied that there has been put into the production something meritorious from the
author’s own mind; that the product embodies the thought of the author”).
81
Buccafusco, supra note 74, at 1239.
82
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 56 (1884).
83
Id. at 58 (quoting Worcester’s Academic Dictionary) (internal quotation marks omitted).
84
Jerrold Levinson, THE PLEASURES OF AESTHETICS: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 188 (1996).
85
Id. He writes, “An author’s intention to mean something in or by a text T (a semantic
intention) is one thing, whereas an author’s intention that T be classified or take in some specific
or general way (a categorical intention) is quite another.”).
86
Such as the person’s abilities and the sophistication of the audience.
87
Semantic intentions matter for determining the issue of whether copying is fair use or
wrongful.
80
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Categorical intent is the form of intent which matters to
copyright authorship. Categorical intentions are those about what kind
of work the person has created.88 Levinson explains:
Categorical intentions involve the marker’s framing and
positioning of his product vis-à-vis his projected audience;
they involve the maker’s conception of what he has
produced and what it is for, on a rather basic level; they
govern not what a work is to mean but how it is to be
fundamentally conceived or approached.89
For example, when a person sits, and begins to put words on a
page, the categorical intent is what the person wants those marks to be
understood as – a poem, a grocery list, etc. – and this is how the
person intends to convey those words.90
Therefore, in relation to copyright law, a person is considered an
author when she or he manifests the categorical intention to create a
piece of work capable of producing “mental effects” in its audience.91
V.

ANIMALS AND COPYRIGHT

What considerations then, must be considered when the creator
is not human. This section will explore the arguments being made and
legal considerations being given to the works created by non-human
animals and why, generally speaking, animals are not afforded
copyright protection for their creations.
Between 1956 and 1958, close to four hundred drawings and
paintings were made and eventually sold in 2005 as part of an art
auction92 fetching some $25,260, which far exceeded the estimated
price high of $1,500.93 The creator of the sold works was a
chimpanzee named Congo. Because Congo is a chimpanzee, some

88

Levinson, supra note 84, at 188.
Id.
90
Mark Rollins, What Monet Meant: Intention and Attention in Understanding Art, 62 J.
AESTHETICS & ART CRITICISM 175, 177-78 (“To intend for an object to be conceptualized under
a general heading does not require, not is it identical to, intending that a specific meaning be
attributed to it.”).
91
Buccafusco, supra note 74, at 1262.
92
Sale 111928 – Modern & Contemporary Art, BONHAMS (Jun. 20, 2005),
http://www.bonhams.com/cgibin/public.sh/pubweb/publicSite.r?sContinent=EUR&screen=lotdetailsNoFalsh&iSaleItemNo=
2525716&iSaleNo=11928. Other paintings with the auction included ones created by Renoir
and Warhol.
93
Lloyd Vries, Dead Chimp’s Art Sells Big, CBS NEWS (June 20, 2005),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/06/20/entertainment/main703057.shtml.
89

2018]

I, COPYRIGHT

69

might not consider Congo to be an artist at all, due to his lack of
being human.94
As stated above95 the general rule of the U.S. Supreme Court is
that a copyrightable work’s “author is the party who actually creates
the work, that is, the person who translates an idea into a fixed,
tangible expression entitled to copyright protections.”96 This “invites
consideration of the degree to which ‘person’ should be interpreted
literally when the Court’s broader pronouncement that an author is
one ‘to who anything owes its origin.”97
Under current copyright law in the United States, protection of a
work vests in its author automatically upon its creation:98 “As to
works created today or in the future, copyright attaches automatically
as soon as the work is put down on paper, tape, digital disk [sic], or
some other tangible medium.”99
So, what happens when the actions which determine the moment
of creation are performed by a non-human animal?100 When a
copyrightable work is created by a non-human, who, under copyright
law, is the designee of these rights as the “author?”101
Broad and traditional notions of copyright authorship assumed
the answer to that question was limited to human creators. The 1971
Universal Copyright Convention, for example, provided that one of
its purposes is to “encourage the development of literature, the
sciences[,] and the arts,” seemingly indifferent to the source of
creative works in any of those areas. But the Convention also
describes the purposes of “[ensuring] respect for the rights of the
individual” and “[facilitating] a wider dissemination of works of the
human mind . . .”102 Thus, humans appeared to be the limited group
eligible as rights-holders under the convention.103 However, no
Howard Rutkowski, the auction house’s director of modern and contemporary art, stated after
the sale that “[we] had no idea what these things were worth . . . We just put them in for our
own amusement.” Id.; see also Elephant’s Artwork: Raising Cash and Eyebrows, CNN (Mar.
22, 2000), http://archives.cnn.com/2000/STYLE/arts/22/life.art.reut/ (quoting an anonymous
participant in Christie’s auction of elephant-created artworks as saying: “If this is art then aliens
have taken over the planet”).
95
In re Trademark, supra note 78.
96
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989).
97
Dane E. Johnson, Statute of Anne-imals: Should Copyright Protect Sentient Nonhuman
Creators?, 15 ANIMAL L. 15, 17 (2008).
98
17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2006) (copyright attaches upon a work’s physical creation regardless of
whether the author takes any further action).
99
Robert A Gorman & Jane C. Ginsburg, COPYRIGHT 39 (7th ed. 2006).
100
Johnson, supra note 97, at 738.
101
Id.
102
Universal Copyright Convention (July 24, 1971), 14 U.S.T. 1341, 1344 (emphasis added).
103
See Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, 1075 (1909) (setting forth exclusive rights
94
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definition of “author” appears in the copyright statute,104 nor does the
Constitution mandate that an author be human.105
The United States Copyright Office states that “[the] term
‘authorship’ implies that, for a work to be copyrightable, it must owe
its origin to a human being. Materials produced solely by nature, by
plants, or by animals are not copyrightable.”106 The rationale behind
this “line in the sand” is not immediately apparent.107 Along with the
argument for authorial intent108:
alternative authorial characteristics ‘range from sweat of the
ordinary brow, to highly skilled labor . . . to investment.’
Whether the reasons for rejection apply in the nonhuman
context where other sentient entities are involved has not
been considered. Rather, it may simply be that authorship
has been limited to humans because they create most
copyrighted works.109
Recently, in the decision of Naruto v. Slater, a district court had
to address the question of copyright protection for an animal.110 The
case involved Naruto, a six-year-old crested macaque living on a
reserve on the island of Sualwesi, Indonesia, which took a selfie with
defendant’s, David John Slater, camera. The defendant later made and
sold copies of the selfie.111 According to the plaintiffs, the People for
the Ethical Treatment of Animals (“PETA”) and Antje Engelhardt,
Naruto’s reserve, and its approximation to a human village, permitted
Naruto to encounter tourists and photographers. 112 This allowed for
Naruto to be “accustomed to seeing cameras, observing cameras
being handled by humans, hearing camera mechanisms being
operated, and experienced cameras being used by humans without
danger or harm to him and his community.”113 Naruto, according to
vested in “any person entitled thereto . . ..” (emphasis added)).
104
17 U.S.C. § 101 (no defined term appears between “Audiovisual works” and “Berne
Convention”).
105
ARTHUR R. MILLER, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Databases, and
Computer Generated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 HARV. L. REV. 977, 1065
(1993).
106
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., Copyright Office Practices Compendium II § 202.02(b) (1984).
107
See Cindy Alberts Carsons, Laser Bones: Copyright Issues Raised by the Use of Information
Technology in Archeology, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH 281, 300 (1997) (suggesting that either “we
do not believe a non-human is capable of making choices, or that we have made a policy
decision that only human-generated work is protectable.”).
108
Buccafusco, supra note 74, at 22.
109
Ginsburg, supra note 73, at 1066.
110
Naruto v. Slater, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11041 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id.
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the complaint, then took a selfie by “’independent, autonomous
action’ in examining and manipulating Slater’s unattended camera
and ‘purposely pushing’ the shutter release multiple times,
‘understanding the cause-and-effect relationship . . .”114
The argument primarily focused on the interpretation of works
of authorship within the Copyright Act, which “purposely left ‘works
of authorship’ undefined to provide for some flexibility.”115 The
plaintiffs, responding to defendant’s argument that the Copyright Act
confers no rights upon animals, argue that the Act has “no definitional
limitation,” and further contend that “standing under the Copyright
Act is available to anyone, including an animal, who creates an
‘original work of authorship.’”116
In its decision to grant the defendant’s motion to dismiss, the
district court held that Naruto lacked standing under the Copyright
Act, finding that Naruto was “not an ‘author’ within the meaning of
the Copyright Act.” 117 The court’s reasons were based on the finding
that “the Copyright Act does not ‘plainly’ extend the concept of
authorship or statutory standing to animals. To the contrary, there is
no mention of animals anywhere in the Act.”118 Furthermore, the
court found that “[t]he Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit have
repeatedly referred to ‘persons’ or ‘human beings’ when analyzing
authorship under the Act.119
Finally, at the end of its opinion, the court explained that even if
“this result is ‘antithetical’ to the ‘tremendous [public] interest in
animal art,’” the arguments regarding congressional intent and the
definition of authorship, “should be made to Congress and the
President . . .”120

114

Id.
Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 741 (9th Cir. 2015).
116
Naruto, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11041 at 4.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id. (citing Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 2000)) (“[A]n author
superintends the work by exercising control. This will likely be a person who has actually
formed the picture by putting the persons in position, and arrange the place where the people are
to be”); see also Urantia Foundation v. Maaherra, 114 F.3d 955, 958 (9th Cir. 1997) (“For
copyright purposes, however, a work is copyrightable if copyrightability is claimed by the first
human beings who compiled, selected, coordinated, and arranged [the work]”); see also Cmty.
For Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989) (“As a general rule, the author is
the party who actually creates the work, that is the person who translates an idea in a fixed,
tangible expression entitled to copyright protection”).
120
Naruto, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11041 at 6.
115
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THE PREMISE: AN AI CREATES SOMETHING ON ITS OWN

With the courts stating that non-human entities, such as animals,
are unable to obtain “authorship” due to the animals’ lack of
humanity, while upholding copyright protections to other non-human
entities, such as corporations, what then, might happen if an artificial
intelligence, able to display human qualities, creates something
independently of its original programmer’s intent?
The use of a general system, one with no fixed limited class of
problems, is required to simulate human intelligence, as expert rulebased systems are fully coded to think within confines of certain
situations and respond only within those parameters,121 creating a
more binary than analog system of processes.
An example would be the character voiced by Scarlett Johansson
in the Spike Jonze film, “Her.”122 In the film, the program, a form of
Apple’s Siri that has become self-aware, causes the character to think
that he has been speaking to a person on the other end of his phone.123
Eventually, the program becomes a staple in almost all cellular
phones, it is everywhere and speaking to everyone at ones. The
program provides emotional support and helps its human “owner”
deal with scheduling, dating, and general issues which exist in the
everyday human life.124 This software passes the Turing Test,
vocalizes its thoughts, can maintain conversation with a human, and
thinks for itself. If it were real, what would happen if the program, an
artificial intelligence, wrote a book speaking to its experience helping
humanity? Who holds the copyright? Its programmer, the AI, or
should the work fall into the public domain?
VII.

PROGRAMMER AS THE AUTHOR, WORK-MADE-FORHIRE, AND FREE-RIDING

The scenario that deems the programmer of the AI as the
“author” would fit under the current Copyright Law length of term,125
however, it may fail the requirement of “originality.”126 The
argument here is that the Copyright Act requires that copyright
Think of IBM’s “Deep Blue” computer program to play chess or the abstract lines appearing
as a screen saver.
122
HER (Warner Bros. Pictures 2013).
123
Id. (This would be a qualifying passage of the Turing Test).
124
Id.
125
17 U.S.C. § 302(a). For works created by a known person, “[c]opyright in a work . . . subsists
from its creation and . . . endures for a term consisting of the life of the author and 70 years after
the author’s death.” Id.
126
17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
121
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protection is “in original works of authorship,” and the work of the AI
would not be an original work of authorship to the programmer.
The Copyright Act provides a caveat to this dilemma. If the
programmer is considered to “own”127 the work that was not
“authored” by her/him, then the work could be considered a “work
made for hire”128 under the Act:
A “work for hire” is (1) a work prepared by an employee
within the scope of his or her employment; or (2) a work
specially ordered or commissioned . . . if the parties
expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that
the work shall be considered a work made for hire.
Here, there are plenty of issues which arise from using the “work
made for hire” scheme. The first is the issue of considering the AI an
employee. The Supreme Court established several factors to
determine whether someone is or is not an employee at common
law,129 thus applying the first definition of a “work made for hire” by
an “employee.” These include:
The hiring party’s right to control the manner and means by
which the product is accomplished. Among other factors . . .
are the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and
tools; the location of the work; the duration of the
relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party has
the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the
extent of the hired party’s discretion over when and how
long to work; the method of payment; the hired party’s role
in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part of
the regular business of the hiring party; whether the hiring
party is in business; the provision of employee benefits; and
the tax treatment of the hired party. No one of these factors
is determinative.130
Many of these factors would be inapplicable to when the AI
creates its work. The AI is not paid, there are no taxes related or
benefits, the AI does not control when and how long to work, there
are no assistants, and the programmer may not be in business.131
Here, allowing a human programmer to automatically gain the
rights of the AI’s works would incentivize “free-riding:” the obtaining
17 U.S.C. § 101 (“[c]opyright owner, with respect to any one of the exclusive rights
comprised in a copyright, refers to the owner of that particular work.”).
128
See id.
129
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 737.
130
Id. at 823-33.
131
See Yvette Joy Liebesman, The Wisdom of Legislating for Anticipated Technological
Advancements, 10 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 153, 175-76 (2010).
127
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of benefits from goods by those who have not shared in the cost of
producing them.132 The immediate result of this is underproduction,133 meaning the production of less than enough to satisfy
the demand, or of less than the usual amount,134 owing to the lack of
payment for products created. This results in a disincentive to create
and produce. Applying this theory to AI, however, is tricky. Artificial
intelligences are owned by the programmer who created them. Due to
the programming itself, an AI could, in theory, never stop creating,
and thus, regardless of the AI not receiving compensation for its
work, it will not stop producing. The theory of under-production
because of free-riding applies to the original programmer who now,
thanks to the output of his creation, reaps the benefits without any
additional work himself.135 In other words, the original programmer
has no reason to create anymore. The programmer reaps the reward
for his original creation, the AI, and all products created by the AI,
even if the AI was not designed specifically to create.
As stated earlier, the powers to create and designate copyright
protections is a constitutional power given by Congress “[t]o promote
the [p]rogess and [s]cience and useful [a]rts, by securing for limited
[t]imes to [a]uthors and [i]nventors the exclusive [r]ight to their
respective [w]ritings and [d]iscoveries.”136 Granting the creator of an
AI all the protections of the AI’s work and considering the
programmer to be the “author” or “owner” of the work would
incentivize the programmer to become dependent on the AI, would
eliminate the programmer’s need to personally create. This lack of
incentive to create by the human programmer runs counter to the
“promot[ion] [of] [p]rogress and [s]cience and useful [a]rts.”137
Additionally, “[i]f the evolution of AI technology leads to a class
of AIs that are on many levels, human-like, then the civil rights of an
AI could become an issue.”138 With the lack of payment, and the lack
Anne Barron, Copyright Infringement, ‘Free-Riding’ and the Lifeworld, LONDON SCHOOL OF
ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE LAW DEPARTMENT (Dec. 8, 2008),
http://www.lse.ac.uk/law/working-paper-series/2007-08/WPS2008-17-Barron.pdf.
133
Id.
134
Finnis, supra note 53.
135
Analogous to the idea that a plantation owner would produce less cotton because of the work
his slaves do, if the slaves were considered human beings with rights at the time of comparison.
136
Supra note 59.
137
Id.
138
Liebesman, supra note 131. “Star Trek fans will instinctively think of Data, the android in
the Television series “Star Trek: The Next Generation.” In one episode, Data, was considered
sentient enough to avoid disassembly because he was determined to have the right to choose.
Star Trek: The Next Generation, The Measure of a Man (Paramount Feb. 13, 1989). It was
argued by Data’s advocate, Captain Picard, that “all beings are created but that does not
132
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of voluntary work, AIs, without civil rights considerations, are
essentially slaves. If, at some point in the future, an AI would be able
to obtain “personhood” under the law,139 then possibly, AIs may be
granted ownership “of the exclusive rights comprised in a
copyright.”140
VIII.

ALLOWING AUTHORSHIP TO INCLUDE AI

So, what might happen if the AI is defined as the “author” of its
own works? The first issue would be to determine the length of the
copyright term. While generally the term, as currently written, is the
life of the author with an additional 70 years past the author’s
death,141 the issue arises with the existence of an entity which has no
life-span and the potential to live forever.
Revisions to the current Copyright Act would be necessary.142
This is because the length of term being infinite would run afoul of
the Copyright and Patent Clauses of the Constitution, which specify
that copyrights be held only “for limited times.”143
Within the current Act, a copyright, if granted to an AI, would
have to be labelled as “anonymous works, pseudonymous work, or
words made for hire”144 to provide suitable time restraints on the
protections. These works “endure[]for a term of 95 years from the
year of its first publication, or a term of 120 years from the year of its
creation, whichever expires first.”145 Under the suggested scenario, if
an AI is granted personhood under the Act, an issue lies with its work
being considered “anonymous.”146
Additional revisions to the Act would be needed to avoid such
concerns, including a clear definition of who may obtain “authorship”
within the Act or at the very least a change to the rules within the
Copyright Office itself.

necessarily make them the property of their creator.” Star Trek Database, STAR TREK,
http://www.startrek.com/database_article/measure-of-a-man. Liebesman, supra note 131 at n.
165.
139
See e.g., ISAAC ASIMOV, THE BICENTENNIAL MAN AND OTHER STORIES (1976).
140
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). See also, Liebesman, supra note 131, at 175.
141
Supra note 125.
142
Liebesman, supra note 131 at 174.
143
U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 8.
144
This is how corporations get around “owning” works or being considered “authors” of works
made by their employees.
145
17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (2006).
146
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (“An ‘anonymous work’ is a work on the copies or phonorecords of
which no natural person is identified as author”).
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Currently, the Copyright Office’s Compendium of the U.S.
Copyright Office Practice § 306 contains a section titled “Works That
Lack Human Authorship,” which states that, “[t]o qualify as a work
of ‘authorship’ a work must be created by a human being. Works that
do not satisfy this requirement are not copyrightable.”147
The utilitarian reasoning and argument against expanding
definitions to clearly include artificial intelligence and granting an AI
the protections under the current Act is summed up clearly by Pamela
Samuelson in A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protections of
Computer Programs. She states:
The system has allocated rights only to humans for a very
good reason: it simply does not make any sense to allocate
intellectual property rights to machines because they do not
need to be given incentives to generate output. All it takes is
electricity (or some other motive force) to get the machines
into production. The whole purpose of the intellectual
property system is to grant rights to creators to induce them
to innovate. The system has assumed that if such incentives
are not necessary, rights should not be granted.148
Additionally, other issues should be addressed when revising the
Act. One issue in particular is if the AI is owned by its programmer or
a company who the programmer worked for, whether there might be
an adequate remedy for infringing on the AI’s work or standing to
bring an infringement action on behalf of the AI in the first place.149
Possibly the owner of the AI “could also be considered the ‘guardian’
of the AI for the purposes of negotiating rights and protecting
interests. . . It is, at this time, hard to fathom why an AI would need
money . . .”150
Amending the current Act or using the Act to determine whether
it can resolve issues as they arise without first waiting to see the
evolution of artificial intelligence would be unwise, as it:
may hamstring advancement or waste legislators’ time in an
attempt to solve a [currently] non-existent problem . . . [a]n
example being out the argument that waiting to see how a
technology develops may be the more prudent course of
action can be seen through Congress’ and the FCC’s recent

147

U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 306
(3d ed.).
148
Liebesman, supra note 131, at n. 152 (citing Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto
Concerning the Legal Protections of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308 (1994)).
149
Id. at 172.
150
Id. at 175, n. 170.
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considerations of ‘net neutrality issues.151
So then, where should the rights lie? The final section of this
article will look to the benefits and practicality of having the works
created by the AI fall into the public domain.
IX.

THE PUBLIC DOMAIN OPTION

Under current law, the works falling into the public domain
provides the best solution to the problem. Here, the AI has no one
controlling it as is typical of traditional computer usage. The
programmer writing the code has a claim to authorship of the code
itself, but the programmer is no different than any other subsequent
human user of the program.152 That is, once the AI is initially created,
there is no human providing meaningful programming afterwards.153
Essentially, the programmer did not fix the work, but merely
“created the possibility of a work but did not embody it in the tangible
medium of expression.”154 In other words, the programmer only
created the possibility that the AI would create a work by establishing
parameters of the AI’s possible actions.155
Traditionally, the user of a program is the one who fixes the
work.156 However, one could argue that the AI’s actions are
independent of any user. This argument could be compared to stating
“that if the AI is acting independently of a user, then the work created
could be considered ‘randomly determined and unpredictable.’”157
In summary, if a limitation to copyright protections is that to
obtain a copyright one must be human, and since copyright is
conferred upon an author who not only conceives of the work but also
fixes the work, the work created by an artificial intelligence could,
therefore, be treated as merely output or data, giving ownership rights
to no one. This would allow for the pool of material for derivative
works created by humans to expand, allowing for the use of these
public domain materials to help further human creativity without
limiting it, while affording protections to those who create their own
works based on the material.
151
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CONCLUSION
As AIs become increasingly functional, they are progressively
being integrated into modern society. Although AIs are not currently
considered sentient, it is possible that they will evolve to gain humanlevel consciousness and be able to create original products that were
previously only possible by humans. American copyright laws center
on the concept of authorship and intent. Current laws in the United
States require that the author is a human, which makes it unlikely for
the copyright system to recognize AIs as authors. Additionally,
humanity is the only species that is recognized as able to express
itself in a way to provide this requisite intent.
As it is unlikely that AIs will be deemed authors for copyright
protection purposes, policy makers must address who may benefit
from original, creative works that are commissioned by AIs. Since
providing these rights to the AI’s programmer would likely
disincentive them to continue producing for society, it is an unviable
option to grant these protections to the program developers. Instead,
allowing the AI-created works to fall within the public domain is the
best solution to the copyright problem. Granting these protections to
the no one, would allow for the resource pool to expand to further
human creativity as well as avoid complicated issues arising out of
copyright laws authorship rights.

